

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EURE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00

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FM USMISSION NATO

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INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 3899

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T USNATO 2165

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: IS TEXT ON NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

THERE FOLLOWS BELOW FULL TEXT OF INTERNATIONAL STAFF DRAFT ON  
NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT. SEE SEPTTEL FOR MISSION COMMENTS AND  
REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE:

BEGIN TEXT:

III. NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT

GENERAL NATURE OF PROPOSAL TO EAST

SUBJECT TO THE CONDITIONS OUTLINED BELOW, THE ALLIES  
SHOULD PROPOSE TO THE WARSAW PACT THAT THE TWO SIDES NEGOTIATE  
A NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT WHICH WOULD APPLY FOR A  
LIMITED PERIOD FOLLOWING CONCLUSION OF A FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT.

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SPECIFICS OF THE PROPOSAL

(A) EACH SIDE WOULD AGREE NOT TO INCREASE ABOVE A BASE  
FIGURE THE OVERALL AGGREGATE LEVEL OF ITS BEGIN BRACKETS (GROUND  
FORCE) END BRACKETS MANPOWER PERMANENTLY STATIONED IN THE AREA

OF REDUCTIONS. THE BASE FIGURE WOULD BE THE GLOBAL NUMBER OF SUCH FORCES IN THE AREA ON EACH SIDE AFTER FIRST PHASE WITHDRAWALS. BEGIN BRACKETS (NO EQUIPMENT OF ANY KIND WOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT.) END BRACKETS THE COMMITMENT SHOULD CREATE NO NATIONAL OR COLLECTIVE SUB-CEILINGS ON NON-US NATO FORCES.

(B) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD COME INTO FORCE ONLY UPON CONCLUSION OF A SATISFACTORY FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES, IN ACCORDANCE WITH C-M(73)83(FINAL). BEGIN BRACKETS (THEREFORE, WESTERN AGREEMENT TO THE NON-INCREASE WOULD BE CONDITIONAL UPON EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OFF THE CONCEPTS OF A COMMON CEILING AND A TWO-PHASE NEGOTIATION.) END BRACKETS OR BEGIN BRACKETS (WESTERN AGREEMENT TO THE NON-INCREASE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY IMPORTANT EASTERN CONCESSIONS, E.G., ACCEPTANCE OF A TWO PHASE NEGOTIATION AND THE LIMITATION OF REDUCTIONS TO GROUND FORCES.) END BRACKETS

(C) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE NEGOTIATED AND AGREED TO IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT. IT WOULD BE CLEARLY PRESENTED TO THE OTHER SIDE AS A MEANS OF LINKING THE FIRST AND SECOND PHASES. THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE CONTAINED BEGIN BRACKETS (IN THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT ITSELF AS A NON-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION) END BRACKETS OR BEGIN BRACKETS (IN A JOINT EAST-WEST DECLARATION MADE ON OR SHORTLY AFTER THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT) END BRACKETS OR BEGIN BRACKETS (IN SEPARATE UNILATERAL DECLARATIONS OF INTENT MADE ON OR SHORTLY AFTER THE DATE OF THE SIGNING OF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT) END BRACKETS.

(D) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BECOME INVALID IF THE FIRST PHASE AGREEMENT WERE NOT IMPLEMENTED OR IF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS WERE BROKEN OFF. A SATISFACTORY SECOND PHASE AGREEMENT, WHEN CONCLUDED,

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WOULD AUTOMATICALLY SUPERCEDE THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT.

(E) IN ANY EVENT, THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD BE LIMITED IN DURATION TO A MAXIMUM OF BEGIN BRACKETS (TWO YEARS) END BRACKETS, EXCEPT THAT THE PERIOD COULD BE EXTENDED BY MUTUAL CONSENT OF THE TWO SIDES. SUCH MUTUAL CONSENT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE, FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS HAD MADE SIGNIFICANT PROGRESS AND SHOWED REASONABLE PROMISE OF A SATISFACTORY CONCLUSION.

(F) THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT SHOULD BE SO FORMULATED THAT IT WOULD IN NO WAY RESTRICT QUALITATIVE FORCE IMPROVEMENTS ON THE WESTERN SIDE OR OTHERWISE HINDER DEFENCE CO-OPERATION WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE. ALSO, THE COMMITMENT SHOULD CONTAIN EXCEPTIONS TO

ALLOW FOR NORMAL EXERCISES AND ROTATIONS; THE EXACT NATURE OF THESE EXCEPTIONS WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF TECHNICAL STUDY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

(G) IN PRESENTING THE NON-INCREASE PROPOSAL TO THE EASTERN SIDE, THE ALLIES SHOULD STATE THAT IT IS MADE WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE POSSIBLE INCLUSION OF HUNGARY IN MBFR AGREEMENTS. FURTHERMORE, IN NEGOTIATING A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT SHOULD BE TAKEN OF THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE LEVEL OF SOVIET FORCES IN HUNGARY CAN BE COVERED BY A NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE IN THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT.

#### ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSAL

(A) PROPOSING A NON-INCREASE OF FORCES COMMITMENT TO THE EASTERN SIDE COULD HAVE THE TACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF:

(1) RESPONDING TO THE EASTERN REQUEST FOR ASSURANCES THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WILL NOT INCREASE THEIR FORCES TO COMPENSATE FOR AGREED US WITHDRAWALS. THE PROPOSAL COULD BE EXPLAINED AS AN EFFORT TO TAKE EASTERN CONCERNS INTO ACCOUNT.

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(2) STRENGTHENING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WESTERN ASSERTION THAT NON-US FORCES WILL BE ADDRESSED IN SECOND PHASE NEGOTIATIONS.

(3) PROVIDING AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR "SYMBOLIC REDUCTIONS".

(4) BLUNTING THE EASTERN DEMAND THAT REDUCTIONS APPLY FROM THE OUTSET TO THE FORCES OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS.

(5) DRAWING THE EAST AWAY FROM THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL OR COLLECTIVE SUB-CEILINGS ON NON-US NATO FORCES. AVOIDANCE OF SUCH SUB-CEILINGS IN THE NON-INCREASE CONTEXT COULD BE USEFUL IN REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF EASTERN DEMANDS THAT THEY BE ENSHRINED IN A SECOND PHASE REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT, WHERE THEY WOULD CONSTITUTE A SERIOUS AND PERMANENT LIMITATION ON WESTERN FLEXIBILITY.

(B) WITHIN THE WESTERN ALLIANCE, A NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF PROVIDING FOR BROADER ALLIED PARTICIPATION IN THE FIRST PHASE OF MBFR.

END TEXT  
RUMSFELD

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